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1 In Jersey, the view has been taken that there are no rescue procedures in 
corporate or insolvency law.2 Within the company law context, the domestic 
legislation, the Companies (Jersey) Law 1991, predominantly based on the 
Companies Act 1985 (United Kingdom), contains a Part 21 dealing with the 
winding up of companies with procedures analogous to those available in 
companies’ legislation in other common law jurisdictions across the globe. 
There are three such procedures, the summary winding up,3 which requires 
the company to be solvent, the creditors’ winding up,4 where the company is 
not, and the just and equitable winding up, which may be instituted under 
certain conditions as determined by the court.5 Unlike in many other 
jurisdictions, however, creditors have no right to petition the court for the 
winding up of a debtor on grounds of non-payment of debts. In fact, access to 
summary and creditors’ winding up is based on the members resolving that a 
winding up takes place.6 In the case of the just and equitable winding up, 
however, an application to the court may be made, not only by the company 
as well as a director or member, but also the Minister for Economic 
Development or the Jersey Financial Services Commission (JFSC).7 The last 
two may also apply for what is known as a public interest winding up, usually 
invoked in relation to companies carrying out regulated activities.8  
 
2 Within companies’ legislation though, there are no rescue procedures as 
such, unlike those known in the law in the United Kingdom, where the 
Companies Act 1985 (United Kingdom) was joined a little later by the 
Insolvency Act 1986 (United Kingdom), the latter making provision for 
                                                 
1 This is a substantial reworking of a case comment first published as Insolvency Practice in 
Jersey: The Novelty of Pre-Packs (2013) 6 CRI 148. 
2 See, by this author, Finding Rescue: Creative Alternatives to the Classic Insolvency 
Procedures in Jersey (2012) 16 JGLR 248. 
3 Article 145 et seq., Companies Law (Jersey) 1991. 
4 Ibid., Article 156 et seq. 
5 Ibid., Article 155(1). 
6 Ibid., Articles 146 and 157 respectively. 
7 Ibid., Article 155(2). 
8 Ibid., Article 155(3). 







corporate voluntary arrangements and administration as rescue processes.9 
In Jersey, more recently though, the scheme of arrangements procedure,10 
which is also a feature of companies’ legislation around the common law 
world, has acquired a use for restructurings at the threshold of insolvency.11 
The advantage of the scheme of arrangements is two-fold, in that its 
outcomes are generally flexible and it avoids the formality of insolvency 
procedures, although it is not a procedure that is by any means a “light-touch” 
one, necessitating time and considerable expense. Nonetheless, it is notable 
that, in other jurisdictions also inheriting versions of the United Kingdom 
Companies Acts, but where insolvency procedures have not been developed 
for some time, the scheme procedure has undergone a renaissance as a 
method for restructuring companies.12 Other restructuring mechanisms in the 
company context, so far unrepresented in the case law, include the merger 
rules, renovated in 2011 to introduce a cross-border merger framework, which 
allow for the possibility for a merger with an insolvent company provided 
consent has been obtained from a court.13 
 
3 Within what might be termed the bankruptcy or insolvency context proper, 
the procedures are largely derived from the customary law, although they 
have been partially codified by statute.14 Creditors seeking a remedy against a 
debtor have available to them two such procedures to initiate: the adjudication 
de renonciation (adjudication of renunciation), also known as the cession 
involontaire (involuntary cession) and the désastre (disaster).15 Both 
processes are quite complex and may require the creditor to undertake 
several steps before obtaining satisfaction.16 The first, the adjudication de 
renonciation, contains features of a foreclosure-type procedure and begins 
with an order of the court, obtained by the creditor on the basis of a judgment 
                                                 
9 Parts I and II (respectively), Insolvency Act 1986 (United Kingdom), which were remodelled 
by (respectively) the Insolvency Act 2000 (United Kingdom) and the Enterprise Act 2002 
(United Kingdom). The administration procedure has also been adopted by a number of 
Commonwealth jurisdictions, including Guernsey (Companies (Guernsey) Law 2008) and 
Singapore (Part VIIIA, Companies Act 1967 (cap. 50)). 
10 Articles 125-127, Companies Law (Jersey) 1991. 
11 Re Drax Holdings Ltd; Re Inpower Ltd [2004] 1 BCLC 10 (in part a Jersey case). 
12 See I. Kawaley, Cross-Border Insolvency in the British Atlantic and Caribbean World: 
Challenges and Opportunities, Chapter 14 in B. Wessels and P. Omar (eds), Insolvency and 
Groups of Companies (2011, INSOL Europe, Nottingham), who charts the use of scheme of 
arrangements procedures in the geographical area under scrutiny. 
13 Article 127A et seq., Companies (Jersey) Law 1991, introduced by the Companies 
(Amendment No. 5) (Jersey) Regulations 2011. 
14 In the cases of the cession volontaire, by the Loi (1832) sur les décrets, the remise de 
biens, by the Loi (1839) sur les remises de biens, and the désastre, by the Bankruptcy 
(Désastre) (Jersey) Law 1990. For those areas unregulated by the written law, the customary 
law as interpreted by the judges continues to be applicable. 
15 See A. Dessain and M. Wilkins, Jersey Insolvency Law and Asset-Tracking (4th ed) (2012, 
Key Haven Publications, Oxford), Chapter 5 and, by this author, Law relating to Security on 
Movable Property and Bankruptcy Study Guide (2013, Institute of Law Jersey, St Helier), 
Chapters 8-15. 
16 Recently, and exceptionally, the court, in the case of Re Estates and General 
Developments Limited (in liquidation) [2013] JRC 027, permitted a foreign receiver, 
appointed in the United Kingdom, to take control of and sell immovable property without 
applying for any local proceedings on the basis of Article 49 of the Bankruptcy (Désastre) 
(Jersey) Law 1990. No such facility is available, however, to the local debtor creditor in a 
purely domestic transaction. 
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debt. That order will normally provide that, unless the debtor pays those debts 
or applies for a cession générale (general cession), also known as the 
cession volontaire (voluntary cession), the debtor is deemed to have 
renounced his property. A dégrèvement (discumberment of security) 
procedure is then used to purge the secured interests from any immoveable 
property and to convey that property to whichever of the creditors is prepared 
to accept it on condition that any prior secured claims are settled by that 
creditor. Any movable property belonging to the debtor is normally disposed of 
alongside the dégrèvement or in a parallel procedure called réalisation 
(realisation). Thus, out of this procedure, given its orientation towards a 
liquidation-style outcome, there is no surplus and no possibility for the rescue 
of a business.17 Furthermore, the biggest disadvantage for the debtor in this 
process is that, in addition to the foreclosure element, there is no discharge 
after the procedure is concluded and the debtor will remain liable for any 
outstanding amounts.18 In such situations, the debtor tends to apply for 
another of the customary law procedures, the remise de biens 
(surrender/handover of goods),19 provided that the debtor has the pre-
requisite qualification, which is to be fondé en heritage (vested in property) or 
its equivalent.20  
 
4 The remise de biens procedure is available for an ab initio application, 
where the debtor is not subject to any procedure, and is also notionally 
available in a dégrèvement at any time up till when the property in question 
has been taken by a tenant après dégrèvement (the tenant after the 
discumberment). If the application is successful and the procedure succeeds 
in delivering its outcomes: payment of the secured creditors in full and the 
delivery of a dividend to the unsecured creditors, no matter how small, then 
the debtor will obtain a discharge.21 In theory also, what property is not 
required to meet the creditors’ claims is returned to the debtor, thus providing 
the potential, however unlikely, of a surplus. As such, the remise de biens has 
been described as the only Jersey procedure of a suspensory type specifically 
to enable the rehabilitation of the debtor.22 This may be contrasted with the 
cession générale, in which, albeit a discharge is also available,23 the surplus 
value of the property not required to meet creditors’ claims accrues to the 
                                                 
17 The older procedures were not designed in an age when incorporated forms were 
commonly available for use in business, the joint-stock company only appearing as an 
innovation in the early 19th century. It is only with some difficulty that the extension to 
companies can be envisaged as the definition of “person” in the Schedule to the 
Interpretation (Jersey) Law 1954 would suggest. 
18 Birbeck v. Midland Bank Ltd 1981 JJ 121. 
19 For details of the operations of the procedure, see F. Benest and M. Wilkins, Can we be at 
Ease with the Remise? (2004) 8(1) Jersey Law Review, copy available at the 
<www.jerseylaw.je> website (last viewed 9 February 2014). 
20 Re Taylor (1999) (unreported) includes share transfer properties as equivalent to the pre-
requisite. 
21 This sine qua non has been consistently reiterated in the more recent cases on its use, 
such as Re Mickhael [2010] JRC 166A; Re Gibbins [2011] JRC 033; Re Venton [2011] JRC 
102; Re Pitman [2014] JRC 008 and Re Reva Holdings Ltd [2014] JRC 026. 
22 Jersey Law Commission Consultation Paper No 2 (November 1998), at paragraph 2.5.1., 
copy available at: <http://www.lawcomm.gov.je/consultation2.htm> (last viewed 9 February 
2014). 
23 Article 10, Loi (1832) sur les décrets. 
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creditor who takes the property during the dégrèvement process. The 
advantage of an application in this context is also that, even where the remise 
de biens procedure itself later fails, what happens is that a cession générale is 
instituted with the usual outcomes, including the discharge. Despite the 
attractiveness of the remise de biens, it cannot strictly be called a rescue 
procedure, because during the realisation of the debtor’s property in order to 
achieve the outcomes of the procedure, the debtor has no choice as to what 
property is realised and in what order, thus rendering the planning of a rescue 
difficult, if not impossible. Thus, the procedure can be described as more akin 
to liquidation in substance. 
 
5 The creditors’ second option, the désastre procedure, is more of a collective 
procedure and does provide a discharge,24 but is similarly liquidation-oriented. 
The process involves the Viscount, an officer of the Royal Court, 
administering the debtor’s estate in a role very similar to that of a trustee in 
bankruptcy. Although the most modern of all the bankruptcy procedures and 
thus containing the features expected of a developed law, such as vesting, 
estate management, debtor control, claim-proving and distribution, claw-back 
and liability as well as discharge provisions, the essence of the procedure is 
to liquidate the debtor’s estate and to distribute the proceeds to creditors. It 
does, nevertheless, offer the opportunity, however unlikely, for any surplus to 
be returned to the debtor, which may assist any eventual return to business. 
In terms of creditor choice, although the adjudication de renonciation may 
involve a debt of any size, a creditor can only apply for the désastre of a 
debtor if there is a liquidated claim of at least JEP 3000.25 In addition, the 
Viscount’s costs may be a considerable charge on the estate in a désastre, 
which may explain why creditors continue to prefer the adjudication de 
renonciation as a route for enforcement of their claims. The same issue of 
costs also applies where it is the debtor who initiates a désastre. In fact, the 
case-law has recently evidenced a trend for debtors to apply for a remise de 
biens, albeit for the most part unsuccessfully, stating that costs are an issue. 
The lack of success may also be due to the fact that the court’s preference is 
now to subject all estates, even the simplest that once could have been 
appropriately dealt with by one of the older procedures,26 to the purview of 
désastre.27 
 
The Flexibility of the Just and Equitable Winding Up 
 
                                                 
24 Article 40(1), Bankruptcy (Désastre) (Jersey) Law 1990 for individuals, albeit only 4 years 
from date of the order opening the procedure, while Article 38(2) subjects a company, 
foundation or incorporated limited partnership to dissolution upon the notice of the payment 
of the final dividend being received from the Viscount by the Registrar of Companies. 
25 Rule 2, Bankruptcy (Désastre) (Jersey) Order 2006. 
26 As contemplated by the rule in Re Superseconds Limited and Others 1997 JLR 112. Note 
also the hierarchy explicit in Article 5, Bankruptcy (Désastre) (Jersey) Law 1990, which 
enforces a duty on the court not to make a declaration where any order relating to one of the 
older procedures (cession générale, adjudication de renonciation or remise de biens) has 
been made. 
27 Re Venton [2011] JRC 102; Re Pitman [2014] JRC 008 and Re Reva Holdings Ltd [2014] 
JRC 026 being recent examples of this preference. 
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6 Returning to the options available, however, in recent years the courts in 
Jersey have begun to develop a wider conception of what a just and equitable 
winding up might include. The procedure is in fact already quite flexible and 
enables the court which opens proceedings to also appoint the liquidator and 
direct the manner in which the winding up is to be conducted.28 Often, the 
order appointing the liquidator will specify the powers the liquidator will enjoy, 
usually formulated by analogy with those available in the other winding up 
procedures. In fact, in one case,29 the court referred to its disinclination to 
agree to a winding up in the hands of the directors as justification for the 
appointment of liquidators, whom it regarded as capable of investigating 
matters relating to the losses the company had suffered fairly and impartially. 
 
7 Because Article 155 is derived from an equivalent United Kingdom 
provision,30 the Jersey courts have confirmed that it is permissible to look to 
English case law to guide Jersey courts as to the interpretations to be placed 
on the meaning of the words “just and equitable”.31 Generally, the court must 
be convinced that no other remedy is suitable, because winding up is deemed 
a drastic and terminal remedy.32 That said, applications of the just and 
equitable procedure are found, just as they would be in the United Kingdom, 
where the company is being run as a quasi-partnership,33 where there has 
been deadlock in management34 or where the company’s substratum 
(fundamental purpose) has disappeared.35 What is interesting about the 
Jersey case-law36 is that the courts have also stated that modern 
developments in this procedure might require a more flexible interpretation of 
the term “just and equitable” and have reiterated the need for a more modern 
approach to the definition of this term in a number of cases.37 
 
8 One of these modern interpretations was introduced into the case-law in 
2009, where the court held that it must also consider what is in the best 
interests of the creditors.38 It also extended the scope of “just and equitable” 
to include what was convenient and would expedite the procedure, particularly 
since, in that case, it was clearly in the best interests of all the creditors for 
liquidators to be authoriszed to seek to secure the stock as soon as possible 
and to continue to trade to dispose of it on a retail basis. This appeared to 
enable the substitution of the just and equitable procedure for the usual 
creditors’ winding up, although originally it was only intended as an 
exceptional procedure for use in problematic cases, such as the quasi-
                                                 
28 Article 155(4), Companies (Jersey) Law 1991. 
29 Re EVIC [2013] JRC 004. 
30 Section 122(1)(g), Insolvency Act 1986 (United Kingdom). 
31 Re Leveraged Income Fund Limited [2002] JRC 209. 
32 Although, paradoxically, it is preferred, in the case of shareholder disputes, to derivative 
litigation and/or the bringing of a remedy for unfair prejudice, as stated in Re Northwind 
Yachts 2005 JLR 137. 
33 Bisson v Bish 2008 JLR Note 46, applying Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries [1973] AC 360. 
34 Jean v Murfitt 1996 JLR Note 8c, considering Re Yenidje Tobacco Co Ltd [1916] Ch 426. 
35 Re Leveraged Income Fund Limited, above note 31, applying Re German Date Coffee 
(1882) 20 Ch D 169. 
36 Beginning with Re Leveraged Income Fund Limited, above note 31. 
37 Re Belgravia [2008] JRC 161 and Bisson v Bish, above note 33, being examples. 
38 Re Poundworld (Jersey) Limited 2009 JLR Note 12, one of the cases that epitomises the 
cross-border nature of operations in Jersey. 
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partnership, management deadlock and substratum cases referred to earlier. 
The court in that case also formed the view, however, that a creditors’ winding 
up should normally apply to the situation of an insolvent company and that the 
court should be cautious before ordering a just and equitable winding up in 
the case of an insolvent debtor. 
 
9 Because of the trading-out features which appeared in Re Poundworld,39 
the just and equitable procedure has also found use in cases involving 
companies carrying out regulated business. One of the first of these involved 
a company licensed to carry on trust company business and manage assets 
on behalf of third parties held in other trusts and companies.40 The company 
had been the subject of close regulatory attention by the JFSC and 
presumably could have been the subject of a public interest winding up.41 In 
this case, the court accepted that a just and equitable winding up was the 
most appropriate remedy for the insolvent company, not least because a 
creditors’ winding up would not permit activity going beyond that required to 
ascertain and distribute the debtor’s estate. Furthermore, with the intended 
managed and orderly transfer of the company’s business to one or more third 
parties, there was a clear public interest in allowing this to occur without 
adverse publicity for the financial services industry oin Jersey, in particular 
because these clients would be likely to have more confidence in a procedure 
that allowed for trading-out to occur. Invoking Re Belgravia,42 the court stated 
that a just and equitable winding up would be the appropriate way of 
proceeding for a number of reasons, including the need for flexibility, the 
avoidance of conflict with the creditors, the need to protect the interests of the 
investors and the need for the appointment of an appropriately experienced 
liquidator. 
 
10 Later cases have referred to these factors as militating for a trading-out 
approach to this type of regulated company. In one of these,43 the court 
referred to arguments in support put forward by the JFSC for the need for the 
company to continue trading to carry out the orderly transfer of client entities, 
which would incidentally represent the only real prospect of further income 
being available to the company. The flexible route that this procedure 
represented would also ensure the JFSC’s Guiding Principles44 would be 
ideally achieved. Also, the application of the procedure would also result in a 
suitably qualified and experienced liquidator being appointed and answerable 
to court, given they were already engaged within the company’s business and 
had a working knowledge of the issues needing to be addressed. Further, a 
                                                 
39 Above note 38. 
40 Re Centurion Management Services [2009] JRC 227. 
41 As contemplated by Article 155(3), Companies (Jersey) Law 1991. 
42 Above note 37. 
43 Re Horizon Investments (Jersey) Limited [2012] JRC 039, which is the subject of comment 
in the article previously mentioned, above note 2. 
44 Art 7, Financial Services Commission (Jersey) Law 1998, states these to be: “(a) the 
reduction of the risk to the public of financial loss due to dishonesty, incompetence or 
malpractice by or the financial unsoundness of persons carrying on the business of financial 
services in or from within Jersey; (b) the protection and enhancement of the reputation and 
integrity of Jersey in commercial and financial matters; (c) the best economic interests of 
Jersey; and (d) the need to counter financial crime both in Jersey and elsewhere.” 
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winding up of this type was preferable, in view of the company’s insolvent 
status, to the creditors’ winding up procedure, under which the company 
would be required to cease to carry out its business except as far as may be 
required for the purposes of the winding up, thus limiting the scope of the 
liquidators’ capacity to act in the best interests of clients.45 There would also 
be a statutory framework and timetable to follow which could impede the 
process of transfer as well as the possibility of a conflict between creditors 
and shareholders as to the choice of a liquidator. Finally, the court canvassed 
the alternative of a désastre procedure, which it said would be unattractive 
given the limited assets available and the high probability that the Viscount 
would be required to spend time and resources investigating the company’s 
business and would perhaps need to engage external advisors and service 
providers, thus increasing the burden on the estate.46 
 
11 The result of these cases appeared to sanction a procedure at the very 
least akin to the “enhanced liquidation” facility available in administration in 
the United Kingdom.47 They also incidentally appear to favour an approach 
that could lead to the rescue of the business itself through using the flexibility 
of the procedure itself to sanction a transfer of the business. This would also 
reflect the “rescue” imperative featured within the same United Kingdom 
provision. Although this is particularly useful in the financial and trust company 
sectors where client interests are at stake, it is of potential application to all 
types of company. It was thus perhaps inevitable that the appropriateness of a 
trading out approach would be canvassed in the case of a non-regulated 
company. This occurred in 2013 with the case of Re Collections Group.48 In 
this case, the Jersey court49 thought it appropriate to extend the scope of the 
just and equitable winding up procedure to include a situation where the 
procedure is initiated in order to conduct a “pre-pack” sale, a type of 
procedure more commonly seen in the context of United Kingdom 
administration proceedings.50 This is the first time, apparently, that the Jersey 
court has done so within the jurisdiction. 
 
                                                 
45 Article 159(1), Companies (Jersey) Law 1991. 
46 Re Horizon Investments, above note 43, at paragraph 35. A later case taking a similar view 
is Re Horizon Nominees Limited and Re Horizon Corporate Directors Limited [2012] JRC 113, 
involving companies belonging to the same group. 
47 Rule 3(1)(b), Schedule B1, Insolvency Act 1986 (United Kingdom), states the purposes of 
administration as: (a) the rescue of the company as a going concern (the “rescue” function); 
(b) achieving a better result for the creditors than would be the case in liquidation (the 
“enhanced liquidation” function); and (c) the making of a distribution to one or more 
preferential or secured creditors (the “receivership” function). 
48 Re Collections Group [2013] JRC 039. 
49 Coram Sir Michael Birt, Bailiff and Jurats Fisher and Nicolle. 
50 A “pre-pack” is a sale of the business conducted by the company, assisted by an office-
holder, to a third party without necessarily all the creditors (apart from the secured ones) 
knowing this is the case. This is largely so as to guard against reputational loss were the 
company known to be insolvent or nearing insolvency. In the United Kingdom, an 
administration procedure is then opened (with the office-holder as administrator) and closed 
rapidly once the sale is sanctioned. Concerns over the possibility of “phoenix companies” 
have resulted in the drafting of a Statement of Insolvency Practice No. 16 (SIP 16) by the 
Joint Insolvency Committee to advise the office-holder as to the appropriate course of action 
in such cases to safeguard the various stakeholder interests. SIP 16 has recently been 
reviewed, with an updated version entering into effect on 1 October 2013. 
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Re Collections Group: The Facts 
 
12 The facts involved a group of companies, which were active in the retail 
trade in Jersey selling ordinary clothing and surfing wear.51 As a result of poor 
retail trading conditions, particularly in the last quarter of 2012, the group was 
in some difficulty and the shareholders had proved unwilling to inject any 
further investment.52 The group’s bankers were also unwilling to extend the 
overdraft any further.53 As a result, the group’s employees, some 47 full-time 
staff and 10 seasonal workers or so, had mostly gone unpaid since the 
difficulties began.54 The group also owed substantial liabilities, not just to the 
banks, but also to their suppliers, landlords and to the Comptroller of Income 
Tax and others.55 What stock the companies had was subject for the most 
part to retention of title clauses and had been substantially discounted for 
sale. The shelves in the retail outlets were bare and what items remained 
were at least a season out of date.56 Any other assets the company had were 
of little value. In addition, there was a dispute with a landlord involving 
asbestos contamination in one of the retail outlets.57 All in all, the court 
accepted the group was in a “dire financial situation” and that the companies 
were insolvent on both cash-flow and balance sheet bases.58 The challenge 
for the court was to determine whether the order could be made, given that, 
with the collapse in the company’s goodwill, not making the order would result 
in the businesses immediately closing and the likelihood that creditors would 
remain “virtually” unpaid.59 
 
13 The proposal to the court was brought by the representor, a director of the 
company,60 who believed that the companies could be restructured, provided 
they were able to free themselves from their historic debts and that new 
investment was forthcoming. In fact, a new private investor had been solicited 
on the basis that a sum of at least JEP 400,000 would be injected if the 
business of the group companies could be acquired by a NewCo to be owned 
jointly by the director and investor.61 As such, the director proposed that the 
companies be placed in liquidation and that the liquidators immediately enter 
into an agreement, a draft of which was produced to the court. Under this 
agreement, the group companies would sell such assets and business as 
NewCo wished to acquire with the price being met by a consideration (or 
cause) equivalent to 20% of the net profits of the acquired business arising 
within 1 year after the proposed acquisition. A sum equivalent to 25% of net 
sale proceeds would also be paid if any part of the acquired business were 
disposed of within the same time-frame. The consideration was estimated as 
                                                 
51 Re Collections Group, above note 48, at paragraphs 2-3, where the group structure is set 
out. 
52 Ibid., at paragraph 6. 
53 Ibid., at paragraph 8. 
54 Ibid., at paragraph 4. 
55 Ibid., at paragraph 8. 
56 Ibid., at paragraph 7. 
57 Ibid., at paragraph 3. 
58 Ibid., at paragraph 6. 
59 Ibid., at paragraph 9. 
60 Ibid., at paragraph 5. 
61 Ibid., at paragraph 10. 
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being sufficient to enable payments to be made to the preferential creditors, 
whether in whole or in part, although there would be no dividend for the 
ordinary unsecured creditors.62 
 
Re Collections Group: The View of the Court 
 
14 The court wais mindful of the wide discretion it had in determining what 
would be just and equitable under the law and to decide whether to make the 
order requested in the case.63 Citing Re Poundworld,64 the court reiterateds 
its capacity to order a winding up under Article 155 even in the case of an 
insolvent company,65 provided it were satisfied that there would be a good 
reason to exercise its discretion to do so.66 It stated that it could order a just 
and equitable winding up even where the company were insolvent, provided 
this step was preferable to the institution of a creditors’ winding up, by 
reference to the interests of creditors or for some other reason.67 The court 
noteds the unusual feature of this case, which was the intention to enable the 
liquidators to enter into an agreement for the sale of the business and/or 
assets of the group companies to NewCo, in which the representor, an 
existing director of the group companies, had an interest. This was to be a 
type of “pre-packaged sale” which the court noteds iwas quite often performed 
by administrators in the United Kingdom. The procedure of administration 
itself did not of course exist in Jersey. Although in some circumstances, the 
Jersey court accepteds such a sale might be in the best interests of creditors, 
given that there is also a potential for abuse, the court referreds to SIP 16 and 
its content. In particular, the court referred to the way in which SIP 16 dealt 
with the issues surrounding “pre-packs” by reference to a number of principles 
contained in its text, serving as guidance to insolvency office-holders involved 
in such sales.68 
 
15 Four paragraphs of the text of SIP 16 weare cited by the court, including 
paragraph 2 on the duties of practitioners and the associated risks they 
should bear in mind when conducting such a sale, ideally recording and 
detailing the reasons for such a sale in order to justify and explain why it was 
appropriate in the circumstances.69 Reference was also made to paragraph 5, 
which required practitioners to be clear about their role as advisors to the 
company and not its directors, while the directors should be encouraged to 
seek independent advice, particularly important if there was a possibility, as in 
the instant case, of the directors acquiring an interest in the assets subject to 
a “pre-pack”.70 Also cited was paragraph 8, on the need to provide a detailed 
explanation and justification to unsecured creditors, who are not normally 
consulted in the sale, so that they can be satisfied the practitioner did have 
                                                 
62 Ibid., at paragraph 11. 
63 Ibid., at paragraph 12, referring to Jean v Murfitt, above note 34. 
64 Above note 38. 
65 Re Collections Group, at paragraph 13. 
66 Ibid., at paragraph 14. 
67 Ibid., at paragraph 15. 
68 Ibid., at paragraph 16. Paragraph 17 goes on to cite what SIP 16, at paragraph 1, defines 
as a pre-pack. 
69 Ibid., at paragraph 18. 
70 Ibid., at paragraph 19. 
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due regard to their position and interests. 71 Finally, mention was made of 
paragraph 9 on disclosure requirements in relation to the identity of the 
acquirer as well as any relationship they might have with directors, 
shareholders or creditors of the company.72 
 
16 As it was apparently the first occasion on which the court was invited to 
consider the possibility of a “pre-pack”, the court wais particularly concerned 
that it iwas not being asked to approve a “phoenix” agreement which would 
simply continue the beneficial ownership in the assets of the business with the 
existing creditors being left behind. As SIP 16 viewed this as a highly material 
factor, the court required the representor to confirm the statements in his 
affidavit, not only that he has no interest in the existing group apart from 
serving as director, but that the existing beneficial owners would not have any 
interest in NewCo.73 That done, the court iwas satisfied that it would be in the 
best interests of the creditors to wind up the group of companies under Article 
155 and for the liquidators to enter into the proposed arrangements. 
Nonetheless, it was not up to the court to direct the liquidators to enter into the 
agreement sought, but simply to authorise them to do so. It would fall to the 
liquidators to assess whether, in their judgment, the terms of the agreement 
would be in the interests of creditors. Furthermore, because of the lack of 
notice to creditors in the instant case, the liquidators should pay particular 
attention to the guidance given in SIP 16.74 
 
17 In doing this, the court accepteds the arguments put forward by counsel for 
the representor as to the suitability of the proposed course of action, 
particularly mindful of the fact that: (i) the companies were hopefully insolvent 
and, without further funds, the directors could not continue business without 
risking accusations of wrongful trading; (ii) no further funding would be 
forthcoming from the shareholders or any other source for the existing group; 
(iii) the employees would be at risk with a potential burden on the public 
purse; (iv) the closure of the activities would be a particular blow to the 
confidence of the retail sector in Jersey, not to mention leaving shop-fronts 
empty; (v) there would be no dividend likely for any creditor if the businesses 
closed; (vi) no other procedure would achieve the same purpose as in the 
instant case because of the time that might elapse before any sale could be 
agreed. Were the proposal approved, not only would a number of the jobs be 
saved, about 40 in total, but there would be a realistic possibility of a dividend 
to creditors within a 12-month period.75 Consequent directions were also 
given to the liquidators as to their powers to effect the sale should they 
choose to do so, although in principle the court thought it an appropriate 




                                                 
71 Ibid., at paragraph 20. 
72 Ibid., at paragraph 21. 
73 Ibid., at paragraph 23. 
74 Ibid., at paragraph 24. 
75 Ibid., at paragraph 22. 
76 Ibid., at paragraph 25. 
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18 Among the many insolvency procedures in Jersey, some of which are 
limited in how creditors may access them, the just and equitable winding up 
has for some time now clearly offered the possibility of consideration of the 
creditors’ interests. The paradox is, however, the fact that the procedure itself 
cannot be initiated by them. Nevertheless, the way in which the Jersey courts 
have used the Article 155 facility innovatively shows their capacity to respond 
to developments in practice aimed at offering a wider range of choices and 
reflection of relevant interests than are available under current insolvency law. 
As developed, the trading out procedure first seen in the case of companies in 
the regulated sector was a step that signified that creditor interests included 
enabling the equivalent of a work-out to take place and the orderly transfer of 
client business. This may be regarded as a clear extension of this concern for 
creditors and stakeholders in the process. The extension of such procedures 
to ordinary companies and the development of a “pre-pack” jurisdiction are 
particularly innovative steps which use the same domestic provision to enable 
a trading out type of practice that is regularly used in other jurisdictions, such 
as the United Kingdom, France77 and the Netherlands.78 Hitherto, to obtain 
administrations, companies in Jersey would have to resort to the use of the 
“passporting” procedure through the issue of a Letter of Request by Jersey 
courts to the courts in the United Kingdom so as to have rescue proceedings 
opened in their regard.79 Now, a local functional equivalent may be available 
in its “pre-pack” form for suitable companies, whether regulated or not, that 
would benefit from a trading out process. 
 
19 The underlying question, though, as to whether Jersey should introduce a 
rescue procedure, is not one that will easily go away. The Law Commission’s 
view, expressed some time ago now, was that the older procedures were 
overdue for a review. This was especially true of dégrèvement, the exit 
procedure for both forms of cession, which they recommended should be 
abolished.80 They also suggested that remise de biens could eventually be 
replaced by a modern suspensory procedure with the Viscount taking over the 
administration of that process.81 Benest and Wilkins have referred to 
proposals emanating in the same period issued by the Jersey Financial 
Services Commission for a new suspensory procedure that have failed to 
progress, which nonetheless they recommend for enactment, but to sit 
alongside a retained remise de biens.82 This author’s view is that the 
introduction of a rescue procedure is an overdue step, but the feeling at large 
is more nuanced, with advocates for both adoption and rejection existing. It is 
not a question that will be easily resolved in the near future, making 
                                                 
77 France adopted this in 2010 as the sauvegarde financière accélérée (accelerated financial 
preservation) variant of the sauvegarde procedure in Article L. 611-10 et seq., Commercial 
Code. 
78 See B. Rumora-Scheltema, Dutch Pre-Pack Alternatives on the Rise (2014) 11 ICR 000. 
79 See the article previously mentioned, above note 2, and, also by this author, Visa Denied: 
An End to the Jersey Practice of Insolvency “Passporting”? (2013) 17 JGLR 182 and 
Passport Renewed: Extension of Rescue Proceedings to Foreign Companies under Section 
426 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (2013) 10 ICR 310, which collectively chronicle the 2013 
Tambrook case through its various stages in Jersey and the United Kingdom. 
80 Consultation Paper No 2 (November 1998), above note 22, at paragraph 4.3. 
81 Ibid., at paragraph 4.7. 
82 Benest and Wilkins, above note 19, at paragraphs 20, 22-23. 
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developments, such as that seen in Re Collections Group, all the more 
necessary so as to provide Jersey debtors with a wider choice to permit the 
restructuring of their businesses in appropriate cases. 
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